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HIS article discusses judicial developments relating to the Texas
law of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts, and other es-
tate planning matters during the Survey period of November 2,
2003 through November 1, 2004. The reader is warned that not all cases
decided during the survey period are presented, and not all aspects of
each cited case are analyzed. The reader must study the full text of each
case before relying on it or using it as precedent. The discussion of most
cases includes a moral, that is, the important lesson to be learned from
the case. By recognizing situations that have led to time consuming and
costly litigation in the past, a practitioner may be able to reduce the likeli-
hood of the same situations arising with his or her clients.
I. INTESTACY
Despite the fact that the vast majority of Texans die without a valid
will, there are no reported appellate cases during the Survey period deal-
ing with intestate succession issues.
II. WILLS
A. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
1. Evidence Sufficient to Raise Fact Issue
As exhibited in In re Estate of Browne, a will proponent will have a
difficult time sustaining a summary judgment that testamentary capacity
exists if the contestant supplies evidence with probative value of lack of
capacity.1 After the testator's death, his wife of twenty years (the propo-
nent) attempted to probate his will. His children and stepchildren con-
tested the will claiming that the testator lacked testamentary capacity.
1. In re Estate of Browne, 140 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.
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The trial court granted summary judgment for the proponent.
2
The Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed. The court began its analysis
by explaining that the proponent has the burden of establishing capacity
under Probate Code Section 88(b)(1). 3 The proponent did submit suffi-
cient evidence to meet this burden such as affidavits from family mem-
bers, doctors, and the attorney who drafted the will. However, the
proponents, several of whom were doctors, submitted evidence that the
testator's medical condition and treatment (e.g., using a respirator and
taking powerful drugs) prevented him from having testamentary capacity.
This evidence was sufficient to raise a fact question with respect to the
existence of testamentary capacity, which precluded a summary judgment
in the proponent's favor.
4
2. Evidence Sufficient to Support Jury Verdict of Lack of Capacity
In re Estate of Robinson5 provided an example of how difficult it is to
convince an appellate court to set aside a jury finding that a testator
lacked testamentary capacity. In Robinson, the testatrix executed Will 1
and Will 2. A jury found that Will 2 was invalid because the testatrix
lacked testamentary capacity and had been unduly influenced. Accord-
ingly, the court admitted Will 1 to probate. The proponents of Will 2
appealed.6
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed. The court rejected the
proponents' claim that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony
of a doctor who testified as an expert witness because the testimony was
unscientific and unreliable for failing to meet the standards of Texas case
law. 7 The proponents claimed there was an impermissible analytical gap
between the medical records the doctor examined and the conclusion that
the testatrix lacked capacity. After an extensive review of the doctor's
testimony, the court determined that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by admitting the testimony.
8
The appellate court also rejected the proponents' claim that there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of lack of capacity.9
The court exhaustively reviewed the evidence presented to the jury and
determined that it was sufficient to support its verdict. 10
2. Id. at 437-38.
3. Id. at 439.
4. Id. at 439-40.
5. 140 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet. h.).
6. Id. at 787-88.
7. Id. at 792.
8. Id. at 788-92.
9. Id. at 799.
10. Id. at 794-99.
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B. FORMALITIES
1. Attestation in Testator's Presence
The case of In re Estate of Brownell serves as an important reminder
that the witnesses to a will should always attest in close physical proxim-
ity to the testator so the testator may see them attesting. 12 In Browne,
the Beaumont Court of Appeals agreed with the contestants' assertion
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment that the testator
properly executed his will under Probate Code Section 59. The contes-
tants presented an affidavit, which supplied facts that could lead to the
conclusion that the witnesses did not attest to the will in the testator's
presence, that is, they signed the will in a hospital waiting room while the
testator was in his hospital room. 13
2. Testator Reading the Will
The court in Browne also briefly discussed whether the testator actually
read the will. Even though not legally required under Probate Code Sec-
tion 59, it is good practice for the attorney supervising a will execution
ceremony to make certain the testator has actually read the will and un-
derstands its contents. The attorney should establish that the testator
read and understood the will in front of the witnesses. The appellate
court in Browne agreed with the proponent that she was not required to
prove that the testator actually read the will or had it read to him before
signing it.14 These matters may, however, impact whether the testator
had testamentary intent and capacity.1 5
C. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
1. Independent Administration
A court may construe a will even if the administration is independent,
as evidenced by In re Estate of Bean.16 The beneficiaries brought an ac-
tion to construe a will and the trial court heard the case. The indepen-
dent executor asserted that the court had no jurisdiction to construe the
will because the administration was independent. Both the trial and ap-
pellate courts rejected this argument. 17 The Texarkana Court of Appeals
based its holding on Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.004(a)(part of the Texas version of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act),
which provides that a person interested in a will may have any question of
construction determined by the court.18
11. 140 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.).
12. See id. at 438.
13. Id. at 438-39.
14. Id. at 439.
15. See id.
16. 120 S.W.3d 914 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).
17. Id. at 916.





It is axiomatic that wills and trusts should be carefully drafted to carry
out the client's intent. For example, if a client wishes to exclude non-
blood descendants from benefiting, a clear unambiguous statement
should be included in the will such as, "under no circumstances may a
non-biologically related person receive property under this will as a child,
grandchild, great-grandchild, or other descendant." Failure to do so may
lead to the type of construction problems seen in Parker v. Parker,19 in
which the key issue was whether the adopted great-grandchildren were
eligible beneficiaries of certain testamentary trusts. Both the trial and
appellate courts agreed that they were eligible beneficiaries.
20
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals recognized that it was bound by the
law as it existed at the time the will was executed, which was the 1931
version of the Texas adoption statute containing the presumption that
adopted children would not take under a will executed by a third person
unless the testator provided otherwise in the will.21 The testator in
Parker stated in his will that grandchildren had to be "born of [the child's]
body" to qualify as beneficiaries.2 2 However, great-grandchildren were
not subject to the same limitation. Instead, the will provided that "the
children, and their heirs, of any deceased child of [the child's] body [are]
entitled to their parent's portion per stirpes."'23 Because the testator
omitted the "of the body" language from this gift over to great-grandchil-
dren, the testator's express language shows an intent to include adopted
great-grandchildren, and the otherwise applicable presumption against
the inclusion of adopted individuals did not apply.24 The court recog-
nized that it might not be logical for the testator to exclude adopted
grandchildren but include adopted great-grandchildren. However, the
court was unwilling to redraft the will to carry out a presumed intent.
25
3. Rights of Life Tenant
Regardless of the clarity of language used in a will, the will may still be
attacked on the ground that it should not be given effect as it is written.
Any additional guidance that the testator provides in the will could re-
duce such claims. In the case of Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co.,26 for
example, the testator could have added the phrase, "including the enter-
ing into of leases which extend beyond the life tenant's lifetime" to clarify
the authority of the life tenant.
In Steger, the husband's will granted his wife a life estate in all his prop-
erty including extensive powers such as the authority to manage, control,
19. 131 S.W.3d 524, 525 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
20. Id. at 535.
21. Id. at 531.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 531-32.
24. Id. at 532.
25. Id.
26. 134 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
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and lease the property for all purposes. The wife entered into mineral
leases with secondary terms extending for as long as oil or gas is produced
in paying quantities. The wife died in 1960. One of the remainder benefi-
ciaries received a secondary life estate. This remainder beneficiary also
entered into mineral leases extending for as long as paying quantities of
oil or gas were produced. In a similar manner to the devise to the wife,
the husband's will granted this remainder beneficiary the power to enter
into leases. This beneficiary died in 1993. In 1996, a child, the sole sur-
viving remainder beneficiary, questioned the continued validity of some
of these leases. This child asserts that the husband's will did not author-
ize his wife and the remainder beneficiary to execute oil and gas leases
extending beyond their lifetimes. 27
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the
express terms of the husband's will granted his wife and the remainder
beneficiary the right to enter into these long-term leases. 28 The court
studied the language of the husband's will, especially the phrases "for all
purposes" and "whatever nature," which followed the grants to the life
tenants of the power to lease the property.2 9 Construing the language of
the husband's will according to the ordinary meaning of the words used,
the court held that the husband's will unambiguously authorized his wife
and the remainder beneficiary to execute any type of oil and gas lease,
including leases that extended beyond their lifetimes.30 The court re-
jected the child's argument that because the wife and the remainder ben-
eficiary could enter into leases only while they were alive, they could not
create a lease that would remain effective after their deaths.31
D. ADEMPTION & AMBIGUITY
A testator electing to make specific gifts in a will should carefully word
the gifts to avoid ambiguity. In addition, the testator should contemplate
possible ademption, and the will should be drafted to reflect the testator's
intent should the gifted item not be in the estate when the testator dies.
Failure to do so may raise problems such as those exhibited in Harris v.
Hines.32 The testatrix's will devised specific real property owned jointly
with her husband. Prior to her death, the testatrix and her husband sold
this property and received a promissory note in exchange. A dispute
arose as to whether the devise adeemed. 33 The trial court held that the
gift was not ambiguous and did not adeem because the gift included the
phrase "together with all additions thereto and substitutions therefor. ''34
The Texarkana Court of Appeals determined that this language specifi-
27. Id. at 364-67.
28. Id. at 375.
29. Id. at 373-74.
30. Id. at 374-75.
31. Id. at 373-75.
32. 137 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
33. Id. at 902.
34. Id. at 905.
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cally provided for the proceeds of the sale of the property to pass to the
devisees, and thus, they were entitled to the testatrix's one-half interest in
the promissory note.35
On appeal, the court began its lengthy analysis by determining that the
devise is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.36 The court
recognized that there are reasonable arguments for both inclusion and
exclusion of the proceeds from the devise. The will did not provide a
clear indication of whether the testatrix intended to include the proceeds
from the possible future sale of the property in the devise. Accordingly,
the court determined that this ambiguity was patent because the ambigu-
ity was apparent from reading the will.37 The court then examined extrin-
sic evidence to ascertain the testatrix's intent.38
The court studied affidavits from the testatrix's husband and her attor-
ney. These affidavits made it clear that the testatrix excluded her daugh-
ter from the specific devise because she did not want the daughter's
husband to have any control over this real property. Her daughter, how-
ever, shared equally with the other children as residuary beneficiaries.
Because the real property was no longer in the estate, the reason for ex-
cluding this child from the devise no longer existed. In addition, the at-
torney's testimony explained that the "substitution" language referred to
replacement of personal property included with the devised realty. Con-
sequently, the court held that the sale of the specifically devised property
caused an ademption and that the proceeds would pass under the residu-
ary clause of the testatrix's will. 39
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. JURISDICTION
1. Transfer from District Court to County Court at Law
An action, such as one to impose a constructive trust or deal with tort
claims against a trust, that might presumably be handled in district court
in a county without a statutory probate court, may actually end up being
decided in a county court at law. In re Stark4° addressed this issue. In
this case, the testatrix's estate was pending in a county court at law. The
beneficiary brought an action in district court against a variety of persons,
including the independent executors of the testatrix's estate. The district
court granted a motion to transfer the beneficiary's action to the county
court at law where the administration was pending. The beneficiary then
brought this mandamus action to force the district court to withdraw the
transfer order.41
35. Id. at 901-02.
36. Id. at 906.
37. Id. at 908.
38. Id. at 905-08.
39. Id. at 910.
40. 126 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
41. Id. at 638.
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The Beaumont Court of Appeals denied mandamus. The court began
by rejecting the beneficiary's claim that a district court lacks the authority
to transfer a case to a statutory county court.42 The court continued, ex-
plaining that such a transfer is authorized under the Government Code
when permitted by local rules as was true in the present case.43
The court next addressed the beneficiary's claim that the transfer was
improper because the beneficiary sought a constructive trust remedy that
was not available in a county court at law. The court stated:
[T]he mere request for a constructive trust will not necessarily oust
the dominant jurisdiction of a statutory county court sitting in pro-
bate. A district court properly declines to exercise its jurisdiction
over matters incident to an estate when, although a constructive trust
is requested, the statutory county court has the power to afford ade-
quate relief.44
In this case, the estate contained sufficient assets to pay the damages the
beneficiary was seeking.45
It is worth noting, however, that the dissent strongly argued that be-
cause the beneficiary sought a constructive trust over certain real prop-
erty and because every parcel of real property is unique, the beneficiary
would suffer irreparable injury if instead of recovering the property, the
court awarded only monetary damages.46
Lastly, the beneficiary argued that the district court should have re-
tained the case because it also involved a charitable trust, and Texas
Property Code Section 115.001 gives the district court exclusive jurisdic-
tion over trusts when the county lacks a statutory probate court.47 The
court rejected this argument because the beneficiary's claims were tort
claims and not within the meaning of the section because they are of a
completely different nature than the enumerated actions.48
2. Class Certification
Shell Cortez Pipeline Co. v. Shores explained that a statutory probate
court does not have jurisdiction over a case merely because one of the
parties is a trust.49 In Shell, a statutory probate court certified a class in a
complex case involving the alleged underpayment of carbon dioxide roy-
alties. The defendants appealed. 50
42. Id. at 639.
43. Id. (applying TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §74.093(a)-(d) (Vernon 1998) in deciding
whether it was proper to transfer a case).
44. Id. at 640 (internal citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 642-43.
47. Id. at 642 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.001 (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
48. Id. at 641-42.
49. Shell Cortez Pipeline Co. v. Shores, 127 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004,
no pet. h.); see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
50. Shell Cortez Pipeline Co., 127 S.W.3d at 288.
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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals first determined that it had jurisdic-
tion to address the issue of whether the statutory probate court had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the class claims.5 1 The court then found that
the statutory probate court lacked jurisdiction. 52 The court rejected the
plaintiff's claim that the statutory probate court had jurisdiction under
Probate Code Section 5A(c) (1999 version) because one of the named
plaintiffs was an inter vivos trust.53 The court explained that for Sec-
tion 5A(c) to grant jurisdiction to the statutory probate court, the district
court must first have jurisdiction over the case under Texas Property
Code Section 115.001. The court examined the lengthy list of claims that
included actions such as breach of contract and conspiracy and deter-
mined that none of these actions actually involved an inter vivos trust.54
"[T]he mere fact that an inter vivos trust has the same or similar claims as
the members of the class does not transform the class claims into actions
that involved the trust. '55
The court also rejected the claim that the probate court had jurisdiction
under Texas Probate Code section 5A(d) (1999 version) which conferred
ancillary or pendent jurisdiction over claims that bear some relationship
to the estate pending before the court.56 In this case, there was no estate
pending in probate court, no close relationship between non-probate
class claims and pending probate matters, and the resolution of the class
claims would not aid in the efficient administration of anything related to
the trust.57
3. Appellate Jurisdiction
In re Estate of Robinson58 reminded appellants that they should always
clearly explain the basis for the court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal so
that the appellants may argue before the court. Sometimes appellants are
lucky even if they fail to do so. In Robinson, the appellate court deter-
mined, sua sponte, that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal of a case that
found a named co-executor disqualified for being unsuitable. 5 9 The
court, applying the Crowson v. Wakeham60 test, held that the order dis-
qualifying the named co-executor from serving was a final order and thus
appealable. 61
51. Id. at 292.
52. Id. at 294.
53. Id. (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(c) (Vernon 2002), repealed by Act of June
20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S. ch. 1060, § 16, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1060).
54. Id. at 293-94.
55. Id. at 294.
56. Id. at 295 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(d) (Vernon 2002), repealed by Act
of June 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1060, § 16, 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1060).
57. Id. at 292-95.
58. 140 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. dism'd).
59. Id.
60. 897 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1995).




A personal representative of a deceased party to a lawsuit may find it
helpful to promptly file the oath, give any necessary bond, and obtain
letters before filing a suggestion of death. A copy of the letters may then
be filed along with the suggestion of death. Compliance with this proce-
dure, although not legally necessary, may prevent arguments such as
those in Moore v. Johnson.62 In Moore, a patient brought a medical mal-
practice claim against her doctor and subsequently died while the lawsuit
was pending. The court admitted the patient's will to probate and ap-
pointed her children as independent executors. They filed a suggestion of
death, requesting that they be named as plaintiffs and that the suit con-
tinue in their names. Without specifying any grounds, the trial judge
granted the doctor summary judgment on all claims. The independent
executors appealed.63
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed.64 The court examined the doc-
tor's claim that the independent executors lacked standing because they
did not file letters testamentary when they made the request to be substi-
tuted as plaintiffs in the malpractice action.65 The court also reviewed the
doctor's claim that the substitution was inappropriate because one of the
independent executors took the oath of office after filing the substitution
request.66 The court rejected these claims.67 Both independent executors
were duly qualified years before the doctor filed the summary judgment
motion.68 The court also explained that the issuance of letters is a minis-
terial act under Probate Code Section 182.69 Texas law does not require
that letters testamentary be filed along with the suggestion of death.70
C. APPEAL
A person dissatisfied with a probate court's decision should file a
timely appeal. Failure to do so may cause problems such as those con-
fronted by the devisee in Roach v. Rowley.71 In this case, the decedent's
sole heir filed an application for letters of independent administration.
Because there was an assertion that the decedent had a valid will, the
court appointed a temporary administrator. The probate court approved
the temporary administrator's nine applications for interim payment of
fees and expenses. The devisee did not object to these applications.
However, when the temporary administrator filed an account for final
settlement of the decedent's estate, the devisee objected to the fees. The
62. 143 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
63. Id. at 340-41.
64. Id. at 344.
65. Id. at 342.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 341-43.
68. Id. at 342.
69. Id. (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 182 (Vernon 2003)).
70. Id. at 342-44.
71. 135 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
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probate court found that the devisee waived his objection to all the fee
orders.72
The Houston Court of Appeals agreed that the devisee had waived his
objection by not filing a timely appeal.73 The probate court's orders ap-
proving the temporary administrator's applications for the payment of
fees and expenses were final and appealable orders.
74
D. TRANSFER
In the case of In re Terex Corp.,75 a district court transferred a wrongful
death case to a probate court under Probate Code Section 5B and Civil
Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.007.76 The El Paso Court of Ap-
peals reviewed prior cases and decided to follow the majority view that
Section 5B is a jurisdictional statute and not a venue provision.77 Ac-
cordingly, the court denied mandamus.
78
The Supreme Court of Texas heard this case and granted mandamus
relief directing the district court to vacate its transfer order. The court
explained that Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.007 does not
authorize a statutory probate court to transfer a wrongful death and sur-
vival case to itself under Probate Code Section 5B when venue is im-
proper under Chapter 15 in the county where the probate is located and a
party objects. 79
Proper venue for an action by or against a personal representative for
personal injury, death, or property damages is now determined under
Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 15.007 according to Probate
Code Section 5B(b), as amended in 2003, and which is applicable only to
actions filed on or after September 1, 2003.80 This change appears to be a
codification of the holding in Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Gonzalez,81 which
explained that Section 15.007 would be rendered meaningless if probate
courts had the power to transfer these actions to themselves.
82
E. COURT-JUDGE ASSIGNMENT
In re Denison8 3 served as a reminder than once a county court transfers
a contested case to a district court, it is too late to request the assignment
72. Id. at 846.
73. Id. at 848.
74. Id.
75. 123 S.W.3d 673, 673-74 (Tex. App.--E1 Paso 2003, orig. proceeding), mand.
granted, 159 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. 2005).
76. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5B (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2004); TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 15.007 (Vernon 2002).
77. In re Terex Corp., 123 S.W.3d at 675.
78. Id. at 674-75.
79. In re Terex Corp., 159 S.W.2d 630, 630-31 (Tex. 2005).
80. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5B(b) (Vernon 2004).
81. 102 S.W.3d 868, 874-75 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), affd, 159 S.W.3d
615 (Tex. 2005).
82. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.007 (Vernon 2002).
83. 145 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
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of a statutory probate court judge to hear the case. The beneficiary re-
quested an accounting under Probate Code Section 149A in county court
and requested the assignment of a statutory probate court judge to hear
the case under Probate Code Section 5(b).84 The county court denied the
motion. The beneficiary then brought a mandamus proceeding.85
The Eastland Court of Appeals denied the writ. Probate Code Sec-
tion 5(b)(1) provides that the county court must grant a motion for the
assignment of a statutory probate court judge to hear a contested case
unless the county court judge has already transferred the matter to the
district court.86 The county court judge transferred the case to district
court under Probate Code Section 5(b) many years before the beneficiary
requested the assignment of a statutory probate court judge.87 Conse-
quently, mandamus was not appropriate. 88
F. LATE PROBATE
Although a will may not be admissible to probate because of a tardy
filing, the will may still be used to show that earlier wills were revoked.
For example, in Schindler v. Schindler,89 the testatrix died in 1996; shortly
thereafter her 1987 will was admitted to probate. In 2001, the proponents
of the will attempted to probate the testatrix's 1995 will. Both the trial
and appellate courts agreed that the proponents were in default for wait-
ing longer than four years after the testatrix's death to probate the will
and were, therefore, precluded from doing so.90
The Dallas Court of Appeals focused on Probate Code Section 73(a),
which provides that a will must be probated within four years of the date
of death unless the proponent was not "in default." 91 In this case, the
proponents did not know of the will until after the four year period but
the proponents were not beneficiaries of the will. Instead, they were ben-
eficiaries of an estate that would have been enhanced by the terms of the
testatrix's 1995 will. The court explained that the beneficiary of the 1995
will was clearly in default because he actually was present when the testa-
trix executed the will, and therefore, he obviously knew of its existence. 92
The court also indicated that his death prior to the expiration of the four
year period was irrelevant.93 The court held that the proponents, as non-
beneficiaries, could not be in a better position than the beneficiary of the
will who was in default.94
84. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 149A, 5(b) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2005).
85. In re Denison, 145 S.W.3d at 804.
86. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b)(1) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2005).
87. In re Denison, 145 S.W.3d at 804-05 (discussing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b)).
88. Id. at 805.
89. 119 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
90. Id. at 928.
91. Id. at 929.
92. Id. at 927, 930.
93. Id. at 930.
94. Id. at 929-30.
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The court determined that the 1995 will could nonetheless be used to
show that the testatrix revoked her 1987 will. However, the court agreed
that the trial court's conclusion that the testatrix lacked capacity to exe-
cute her will was supported by the facts. 95
G. DISQUALIFICATION OF EXECUTOR
Although appellate courts are usually reluctant to overturn a trial
court's finding that a person is unsuitable to serve as executor, the dis-
qualified person may nonetheless be able to show that the trial court's
decision was an abuse of discretion. For example, in In re Estate of
Robinson,96 the testatrix named three co-executors in her will: Mary,
Garland, and Bank. Bank declined to serve and Mary convinced the trial
court that Garland was unsuitable under Probate Code Section 78(e).
The basis of the unsuitability centered around Garland's involvement
with the attempted probate of a later will that the court found invalid
because the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity. The court appointed
Mary as the sole executor and Garland appealed.97
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed holding that the trial
court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles when it
found that Garland was unsuitable. 98 The court explained that because
Garland was named in the testatrix's will as a co-executor, Mary had the
burden of establishing Garland's disqualification. 99 Because there was no
statutory or judicial definition of "unsuitable," the court reviewed Texas
cases in which the appellate courts concluded that a person was unsuita-
ble to serve as an executor.1 00 Although the court recognized that the
trial court has broad discretion in finding a proposed executor to be un-
suitable, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion because it
acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner when it denied Garland's
application.10 1
The court of appeals reviewed the facts that led the trial court to con-
clude that Garland had a conflict of interest, an adversary relationship,
hostility, an inability to perform his duties, or a duty to contest (rather
than advocate) the testatrix's later will. 10 2 Some of the facts that showed
the unreasonableness of the trial court's holding included that Garland
was not a beneficiary under the will, did not have a claim against the
estate, was not in conflict merely because he provided accounting services
for some involved parties and their businesses, did not take sides with
respect to the validity of the later will, and was willing to do whatever was
legally required of him as executor, even if it meant suing his own ac-
95. Id. at 931-32.
96. 140 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. dism'd).
97. Id. at 804-05.
98. Id. at 812-13.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 805-06.
101. Id. at 810-13.
102. Id. at 808-11.
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counting clients. 10 3
H. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION
A person may not ignore statutory time prerequisites, even if the per-
son is anxious for the administration to proceed. For example, in In re
Estate of Bean,10 4 the trial court ordered the independent executor to
partition and distribute the estate approximately thirteen months after
the estate was opened. The executor appealed claiming that the court
lacked jurisdiction to issue this order because Probate Code Sec-
tion 149B(a) prohibits an interested person from demanding a distribu-
tion until two years have elapsed from the date the independent
administration was created. 10 5
The Texarkana Court of Appeals agreed. It did not matter that the
independent executor did not raise this issue at the trial court level be-
cause the issue involved subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised
for the first time on appeal.10 6 In addition, subject matter jurisdiction
may not be waived by the parties.10 7
I. AUTHORITY OF HEIR
1. No Administration Pending
Problems may arise when the original parties to an action die and suc-
cessors-in-interest take over. To avoid these problems, the status of the
successors should be clearly documented and presented to the court. In
Kenseth v. Dallas County, 0 8 the plaintiff died during the course of a
highly complex case dealing with matters not relevant to estate planning.
The issue arose whether an heir was a proper substitute plaintiff even
though she was not appointed by the probate court as the plaintiff's per-
sonal representative. 10 9 The Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed the appli-
cable case law as well as Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 151 and concluded
that "if no estate administration is pending and none is necessary, the
plaintiff's heir may appear in the case on the plaintiff's behalf." 110 Ac-
cordingly, the heir was a proper appellant and had standing to represent
the plaintiff's estate."'
2. Personal Representative Appointed
An heir may have standing to bring a survival action on behalf of the
estate even though a personal representative is currently serving, if the
103. Id.
104. 120 S.W.3d 914 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
105. Id. at 916 (discussing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149B(a) (Vernon 2003)).
106. Id. at 919.
107. Id.
108. 126 S.W.3d 584 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
109. Id. at 595.
110. Id. at 596.
111. Id. at 595.
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representative (1) cannot bring the suit, (2) will not bring the suit, or (3)
has interests that are antagonistic to those of the estate.11 2 The operation
of this principle formed the basis of the court's decision in Mayhew v.
Dealey.113 After her father's death under suspicious circumstances, the
daughter brought suit against her brother (the father's son) for damages
resulting from allegedly causing their father's death. The daughter pre-
vailed. The son appealed on many grounds including that the daughter
lacked standing to bring a survival action on behalf of her father's estate
because she was not the executor." 4
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the daughter had standing. The
court agreed that usually only a duly appointed personal representative
may bring a survival action to recover property belonging to a decedent's
estate."l 5 However, there are several exceptions to this rule with one of
them being that the personal representative cannot or will not bring the
suit or the personal representative's interests are antagonistic to the es-
tate. 116 The executor testified and submitted an affidavit stating that he
would not bring a lawsuit in connection with the daughter's claims on
behalf of the estate. Thus, the daughter had standing to pursue the sur-
vival action."17
J. FINAL ACCOUNTING
An interested person has standing to object to a final accounting. For
example, in Roach v. Rowley, the decedent's sole heir filed an application
for letters of independent administration.' 1 8 Because there was an asser-
tion that the decedent had a valid will, the court appointed a temporary
administrator. The probate court approved the temporary administra-
tor's nine applications for interim payment of fees and expenses. The
devisee did not object to these applications. However, when the tempo-
rary administrator filed an account for final settlement of the decedent's
estate, the devisee objected to the fees. The probate court found that the
devisee lacked standing to object to the final accounting.119
The Houston Court of Appeals determined that the devisee did have
standing to object to the final accounting.' 20 The temporary administra-
tor argued that the devisee was attempting to recover property belonging
to the state by objecting to the final account and therefore lacked stand-
ing under Frazier v. Wynn.' 21 The court rejected this argument and ex-
plained that the devisee was not attempting to recover estate property,
112. See Mayhew v. Dealey, 143 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
113. Id. at 356.
114. Id. at 359.
115. Id. at 370.
116. Id. at 370-71.
117. Id. at 371.
118. 135 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
119. Id. at 846.
120. Id. at 847.
121. 472 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1971) (holding that before heirs could sue to recover estate
property, they must prove that no administration is pending and that none is necessary).
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but rather was objecting to the final accounting as an interested person
under Probate Code Section 10.122
K. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
As demonstrated by In re Estate of Robinson,123 a party may join a
timely filed will contest even after the normal statute of limitations has
expired. In Robinson, a will was properly contested within two years af-
ter its admission to probate as required by Probate Code Section 93. Af-
ter the two years elapsed, additional parties joined the contest. Both the
trial and Corpus Christi Court of Appeals agreed that these parties were
not barred by the two-year statute of limitations because they intervened
as plaintiffs even though they would have been barred if they had insti-




The case of Dolenz v. Vail discussed relatively fundamental issues re-
garding trust jurisdiction.125 However, there may be unstated lessons not
reflected in the relatively simple legal points discussed in this case. The
beneficiary was also the attorney who argued the appeal.1 26 State Bar of
Texas records reflected that he was suspended from the practice of law in
1999 during the pendancy of the original case. 127 The controversy began
in an earlier action in which the beneficiary, who was also the successor
trustee, brought suit in a statutory probate court to recover property be-
longing to the trust. The court determined that the trust did not own any
property and ordered that the beneficiary take nothing. In this case, the
beneficiary sued in a district court claiming that the statutory probate
court had no jurisdiction to rule on the existence of trust property. The
beneficiary asserted that only a district court under Property Code Sec-
tion 115.001 could rule on trust disputes. 128 The beneficiary also claimed
that the judgment was defective because he was sued only in his individ-
ual capacity, not as a successor trustee. The district court dismissed the
beneficiary's claims for lack of jurisdiction, and the beneficiary
appealed. 129
122. Roach, 135 S.W.3d. at 847 (discussing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10 (Vernon
2003)).
123. 140 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet. h.).
124. Id. at 800-01.
125. 143 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
126. See id. at 516-17.
127. See Dolenz v. State Bar of Texas, 72 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.)
(affirming trial court's judgment of disbarment).
128. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.001 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2004).
129. Dolenz, 143 S.W.3d. at 516-17.
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The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed. The court explained that a stat-
utory probate court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court
with regard to all actions involving an inter vivos trust and therefore, it
had jurisdiction. 130 The court also found that the beneficiary's failure to
be served in a representative capacity was irrelevant because the benefici-
ary waived the objection by making a general appearance before the
court.131
2. Trustee as Plaintiff
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shores132 explained that a statutory probate court
does not have jurisdiction over a case merely because the plaintiff is a
trustee. In this case, the trustees sued the defendant to recover under-
paid carbon dioxide royalties arising from interests held in trust in statu-
tory probate court. The issue arose whether the statutory probate court
had subject matter jurisdiction over the trustees' claims. The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals examined the applicable (1999) versions of Probate
Code Sections 5 and 5A and concluded that the statutory probate court
lacked jurisdiction. 133
The court explained that the trustees' claims did not fall within any of
the enumerations in the Probate Code. Therefore, before the statutory
probate court had jurisdiction, it must first have been established that the
district court had jurisdiction under Property Code Section 115.001. The
trustee's cause of action was not expressly listed in this section. The trust-
ees, however, argued that the proceeding was nonetheless one "concern-
ing" a trust under Section 115.001(a)(6) or (a)(7) because the Property
Code grants trustees the ability to enter into mineral leases and to contest
claims by or against a trust.1 34
The court rejected this argument stating, "[t]he mere fact that a plain-
tiff happens to be a trustee, however, does not transfer a case into one
'concerning trusts.'"135 Accordingly, because the district court did not
have jurisdiction over this case under the Property Code, the co-extensive
jurisdiction of the statutory probate court was not triggered. 136
B. TRUST INTENT
Hubbard v. Shankle showed that even a clear, unambiguous designa-
tion of a person as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy may be con-
tested if the relationship between the beneficiary and the insured is
130. The court applied the 1998 version of Probate Code Section 5(A)(c) (the
equivalent authority is now found in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(e) (Vernon 2003)).
131. Dolenz, 143 S.W.3d at 517-18.
132. 128 S.W.3d 718 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); see supra note 32 and ac-
companying text.
133. Mobil Oil Corp., 128 S.W.3d at 720-21 (discussing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 5,
5A (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
134. Id. at 723-25 (discussing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.0016 (Vernon Supp. 2004)).




upsetting to the insured's family members. 137 In this case, the insured
removed his ex-wife as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy and
replaced her with a woman whom he had been dating for about three
months after meeting her on the Internet. The insured told her that he
wanted her to have the money and that he wanted her take care of his
toddler's college expenses in the future. Later, the insured died during
sexual activities with this woman. The insurance company paid her the
proceeds of the life-insurance policy. The administratrix of the insured's
estate sued her to recover the proceeds. 138 The trial court determined
that the insured voluntarily named her as the recipient of his life insur-
ance proceeds, and that she had no legal obligation to use any of the
proceeds for the toddler's future college expenses. 139 The administratrix
appealed. 140
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed. The court examined the
facts and determined that there was no evidence to support any of the
administratrix's claims which included breach of contract, promissory es-
toppel, actual fraud, constructive fraud, express trust, resulting trust, con-
structive trust, money had and received, unjust enrichment, and quasi-
contract.141
With regard to the administratrix's argument that the insured created
an express trust for the toddler, the court noted that the insured's conduct
was inconsistent with having trust intent.142 For example, the insured did
not clearly place the proceeds in trust. When he changed the beneficiary
designation on the policy, he did not include any type of trust designation.
Rather, the beneficiary was named individually. 143
Although not actually stated by the court, all that really existed was a
daughter, the administratrix, who was very upset because her father (the
insured) removed his ex-wife (the administratrix's mother) as the benefi-
ciary of a policy with a face value of over $100,000 and named a woman
as the beneficiary with whom he had a very short-term relationship and
who "triggered" his death via sexual activity.
C. REVOCATION
McClure v. JPMorgan Chase Bank reinforced the rule that if a settlor
specifies a method of trust revocation, the settlor must comply exactly
with that method for a revocation to be effective. 44 In McClure, the set-
tlor created an inter vivos trust. The settlor retained the power to revoke
the trust, provided the revocation was in writing and the writing was de-
livered to the trustee. Later, the settlor executed a will leaving the major-
137. 138 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
138. Id. at 479.
139. Id. at 479-80.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 480-87.
142. Id. at 483-85.
143. Id. at 484-85.
144. 147 S.W.3d 648, 455 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
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ity of her estate to this trust. After the settlor's death, a dispute arose as
to whether a subsequent holographic will operated to revoke the trust so
that trust property would pass under the terms of this will rather than the
trust. The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the ho-
lographic will did not revoke the trust. 145
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals agreed. The court began its analysis
by recognizing that if a settlor specifies the method of revocation, that
method must be followed for an attempted revocation to be effective. 146
The court explained that the key to deciding the case was whether this
holographic will was delivered to the trustee prior to the settlor's death.
After examining the evidence, the court found nothing to raise a fact is-
sue regarding the trustee's lack of receipt of a notice of revocation. Ac-
cordingly, the court affirmed the summary judgment that the settlor did
not effectively revoke the trust. 147
D. CHARITABLE TRUST
A person desiring to establish a charitable trust must make certain that
his or her purpose will be deemed charitable by a court. The person's
belief that the purpose is charitable is not sufficient; the court in Marsh v.
Frost National Bank made this clear. 148 In the case, the testator's will
contained a provision requiring the executor to sell certain property, in-
vest the proceeds, and later turn the property over to the United States
President, Vice-President, and Speaker of the House as trustees. The
money was to be invested until it was sufficient to create a trust with
$1,000,000 for every American who is eighteen years old or older with no
one being denied a share due to race, religion, marital status, sexual pref-
erence, or the amount of wealth. Testator anticipated this would take 346
years. 149
The executor filed this action to obtain a construction of this gift. The
heirs argued that the testator attempted to create a private trust, which
failed because it violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Texas At-
torney General intervened under Property Code Section 123.002 and ar-
gued that the testator established a charitable trust.15 0 The trial court
found that the trust was charitable. 5 1
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed. After recognizing that
whether a given purpose is charitable is a question of law for the court to
decide, the court began its analysis by looking at the traditional catego-
ries of charitable purposes as set out in Section 368 of the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts that include:
145. Id. at 649-51.
146. Id. at 649.
147. Id. at 653-56.
148. 129 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
149. Id. at 177.
150. Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 123.002 (Vernon 1995).
151. Marsh, 129 S.W.3d at 176-77.
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(a) the relief of poverty;
(b) the advancement of education;
(c) the advancement of religion;
(d) the promotion of health;
(e) governmental or municipal purposes;
(f) other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the
community. 152
The court reasoned that the only category in which the testator's purpose
potentially might fall is the last category.1
53
The court concluded that the testator's purpose was not charitable be-
cause it did not go beyond merely providing financial enrichment to indi-
vidual members of the community.154 The court explained that the
purpose must promote the social interest of the community as a whole. A
trust to distribute money without regard to the donees' financial needs or
how the donees must use the money did not show that the testator had
the requisite intent to benefit the public despite the testator's generosity
and benevolence. 155
The court recognized that there is a strong presumption in favor of
charitable trusts and that they should be construed liberally to uphold
their validity.156 But, in this case, there was no charitable intent, and it
would have been inappropriate to apply liberal construction rules to cre-
ate a charitable intent where none existed. 157
Because the trust was not charitable, the court agreed that it violated
the Rule Against Perpetuities as stated in Property Code Sec-
tion 112.036.158 Accordingly, Property Code Section 5.043 was triggered
and authorized the court to reform or construe the trust according to the
doctrine of cy pres to give effect to the general intent of the testator
within the limits of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 159 The testator's gen-
eral intent was to create a trust to financially enrich the American public.
The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the feasibility
of reforming the testator's bequest.160
E. STANDING TO REQUEST ACCOUNTING
Faulkner v. Bost demonstrated that an individual may be deemed an
interested person in a trust even though the person is not a named benefi-
ciary or trustee.16' In Faulkner, a mother created a trust naming her
daughter as the trustee. The mother assigned to the trust any interest she
might later acquire from her mother (grandmother). The grandmother
152. Id. at 177-78 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959)).
153. Id. at 178.




158. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.036 (Vernon 1995).
159. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
160. Marsh, 129 S.W.3d at 179-80.
161. 137 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2004, no pet. h.).
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later created her own trust for the benefit of the mother and her siblings
that would terminate at her death. After the grandmother died, the
mother reaffirmed the assignment. The daughter (as trustee of the
mother's trust) sought an accounting from the trustee of the grand-
mother's trust. 162
The Tyler Court of Appeals determined that the daughter had standing
to bring the accounting action as an interested person as defined by Prop-
erty Code Section 111.004(7).163 Although the daughter was not a named
trustee or beneficiary of the grandmother's trust, she did have an interest
by virtue of her mother's assignment. The court noted the spendthrift
provision in the grandmother's trust did not negate the assignment. The
effectiveness of the spendthrift provision ended when the grandmother
died and the mother reaffirmed the assignment after the grandmother's
death.164
F. SECTION 867 MANAGEMENT TRUSTS
Despite unclear statutory language, the court in Bank of Texas, N.A.,
Trustee v. Mexia 165 explained that the court may terminate a Probate
Code Section 867 management trust if doing so is in the ward's best inter-
est, regardless of whether the ward is a minor or an incompetent. 166 In
this case, a court created a guardianship management trust for a minor
under Probate Code Section 867. Less than one year later, the guardian
filed an application to terminate the trust. The court examined the in-
vestments and found that they had lost approximately $300,000. Accord-
ingly, the court terminated the trust because doing so would be in the
minor's best interest.167
The trustee appealed arguing that the standard to terminate a trust is
whether the settlor's intent has been met, not whether termination is in
the minor's best interest as described in Texas Property Code Sec-
tion 112.054. The trustee then pointed to Probate Code Section 870,
which permits the court to terminate a management trust for an incompe-
tent ward if doing so is in the ward's best-interest, but which does not
include a best interest standard if the beneficiary is a minor. 168
The Dallas Court of Appeals rejected the trustee's argument. The
court focused on Probate Code Section 867, which authorized the court
to create a trust if it is in the minor's best interest, and Probate Code
Section 869, which allowed the court to terminate a management trust at
any time. Accordingly, the trial court could terminate the management
trust because doing so was in the minor's best interest. 169
162. Id. at 256-57.
163. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(7) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
164. Faulkner, 137 S.W.3d at 259-61.
165. 135 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
166. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 867 (Vernon 2003).
167. Mexia, 135 S.W.3d at 358.
168. Id. at 364 (discussing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 870 (Vernon 2003)).
169. Id. at 364-65 (discussing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 867, 869 (Vernon 2003)).
2005] 1225
SMU LAW REVIEW
V. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. MALPRACTICE
In Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc.,170 the benefi-
ciaries sued the attorneys who prepared the testator's will, claiming that
they provided negligent advice and drafting services. The beneficiaries
asserted that the testator's estate incurred over $1.5 million in unneces-
sary federal estate taxes because of the malpractice. The trial court
granted the attorneys' motion for summary judgment on the basis that
the beneficiaries could not establish that the attorneys owed them a duty
because the beneficiaries were not in privity with the attorneys. The ben-
eficiaries appealed. 171
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. The court explained that
privity between the beneficiaries and the attorneys is mandated by
Barcelo v. Elliott,172 and thus, the court had no choice but to affirm. The
court stated that it was bound to follow this holding of the Supreme
Court of Texas even though this court "may entertain a contrary
opinion." 173
The Supreme Court of Texas granted the beneficiaries' petition for re-
view. Perhaps the court will decide to revisit its holding in Barcelo. Prac-
titioners should monitor the progress of this case closely.
B. P.O.D. ACCOUNTS
Clients must understand that multiple-party accounts such as P.O.D.
accounts, trust accounts, and joint accounts with survivorship rights pass
under the terms of the account contracts and not under their wills. The
estate planner should carefully question each client about the existence of
multiple-party accounts, determine if they were created correctly, and de-
termine whether the client actually intends the property to pass outside of
the probate estate in an attempt to avoid litigation such as that which
occurred in Punts v. Wilson. 174
In Punts, the decedent opened several P.O.D. accounts and designated
a beneficiary as the person entitled to the funds upon his death. The
decedent's will left the remainder of his estate in equal shares to the ben-
eficiary and the decedent's friend. The beneficiary was named as the in-
dependent executor of the will. After the decedent died, the beneficiary
made withdrawals from the P.O.D. accounts in excess of one-half million
dollars. The beneficiary did not include these accounts in the estate in-
ventory. The friend sued the beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and
conversion, claiming that the beneficiary's actions deprived him of one-
half of the funds in the accounts. The trial court granted the beneficiary's
170. 141 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. granted).
171. Id. at 707.
172. 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996).
173. Belt, 141 S.W.3d at 709.
174. 137 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
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motion for summary judgment, and the friend appealed.1 75
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed. The court explained that
although the beneficiary owed fiduciary duties to the friend by virtue of
being the executor of the decedent's estate, the beneficiary owed no du-
ties to the friend with respect to assets that are not included in the dece-
dent's probate estate.176 The decedent properly created the P.O.D.
accounts and properly named the beneficiary as the P.O.D. payee. The
court applied Probate Code Sections 439(b) and 439A(b)(2) and held
that the funds belonged to the beneficiary immediately upon the dece-
dent's death and were not part of the decedent's probate estate. 177 Con-
sequently, the beneficiary owed no duty to the friend with respect to
these funds. 178
The court also rejected the friend's attempt to use extrinsic evidence to
prove the decedent's intent that the beneficiary and the friend share the
funds equally. 179 Likewise, the court deemed it insignificant that the ben-
eficiary obtained checks payable to the beneficiary as the executor of the
decedent's estate when he withdrew the funds. Following a long line of
Texas cases, the court explained that if the P.O.D. agreement is complete
and unambiguous, then parol evidence is inadmissible to vary, add to, or
contradict its terms.1
8 0
C. POWER OF ATTORNEY
1. Breach of Duty
Musquiz v. Marroquin held that a durable power of attorney, which
names two or more agents, will be construed to create a joint agency un-
less the power affirmatively establishes a joint and several agency.18 In
Musquiz, the principal signed a durable power of attorney giving broad
powers to his son and daughter as co-agents. The power contained an
exculpatory clause and authorized self-dealing. The daughter used the
principal's funds to make improvements to the principal's home and then
sold and deeded the house to herself and her husband. The daughter also
engaged in other self-dealing transactions. Subsequently, the principal
died with a valid will leaving her entire estate to her son. After the
daughter's actions came to light, the son sued the daughter alleging
breach of fiduciary duty as well as trespass to try title. The trial court
agreed with the son and set aside the sale and related self-dealing transac-
tions. This resulted in the son receiving the home, along with a damage
award for the property's fair-rental value during the time the daughter
occupied the home and attorney's fees. The daughter appealed the
175. Id. at 890.
176. Id. at 892.
177. Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 439(b), 439A(b) (Vernon 2003).
178. Punts, 137 S.W.3d at 891-92.
179. Id. at 893.
180. Id.
181. 124 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
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decision.182
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals examined the power of attorney
and determined that it established a joint agency because the principal
named two agents, and there was no language supporting the creation of
a joint and several agency.183 Accordingly, all acts on behalf of the prin-
cipal needed the joinder of both agents.1 84 Because the son did not join,
the daughter's actions were properly set aside as null and void. However,
the award of attorney's fees was improper because attorney's fees are not
recoverable in trespass to try title nor breach of fiduciary duty actions. 185
2. Jurisdiction
Musquiz also discussed jurisdiction as it relates to acts of agents. The
case was filed and heard in the district court. The appellate court agreed
that the district court had jurisdiction even though the probate of the
principal's estate was pending in a statutory county court. The court re-
jected the agent's claim that the statutory county court had exclusive ju-
risdiction because the probate case was filed first. The court explained
that although Probate Code Sections 5 and 5A provide that the probate
court has jurisdiction over matters incident to estate, these sections do
not remove the district court's jurisdiction.1 86
182. Id. at 908-09.
183. Id. at 911-12.
184. Id. at 912.
185. Id. at 911-13.
186. Id. at 909-11 (discussing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 5, 5A (Vernon 2003 & Supp.
2005)).
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